The theoretical roots of the EMU institutions and policies during the crisis by Acocella, Nicola
 Università degli Studi di Roma “La Sapienza” 
Via del Castro Laurenziano 9, 00161 Roma (RM) 
T (+39) 06 49766433  F (+39) 06 4957606 
www.memotef.uniroma1.it 
 
  
 
THE THEORETICAL ROOTS OF EMU INSTITUTIONS 
AND POLICIES DURING THE CRISIS 
Nicola Acocella 
Working paper n.126 
March  2014 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
 
 
THE THEORETICAL ROOTS OF EMU INSTITUTIONS 
AND POLICIES DURING THE CRISIS 
 
Nicola Acocella
1
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
In this paper we aim at two targets: i) to look for the theoretical roots of the EMU institutions and 
to check whether the current economic doctrine still supports them; ii) to discuss the 
appropriateness of these institutions and the policies adopted by European policymakers in 
order to exit the crisis, specifically with respect to the issues of fiscal policy and public debt. A 
general issue of inappropriateness of institutions arises both sides of the Atlantic. However, in 
Europe the problems raised by the specific nature of the crisis of the private debt have been 
augmented by those of the public debt for reasons again related to the institutional framework.  
The evolution of economic thought can contribute to explain the differences between the 
policies that were adopted on the two sides of the Atlantic through its influence on the 
respective institutions. Time has passed which should have led to a radical change of most of 
the still current institutional architecture, but a sort of hysteresis is in place. This has a number 
of possible explanations, such as those underlined by Galbraith (1987). However, in order to 
explain it one should refer not only to normal and physiological lags, but also the opposing 
interests, the value judgments and visions prevailing in some European countries and the 
dominant role of Germany, which conveys them. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
As is well known, the current crisis started in the USA in 2007 but soon spread to 
Europe. Its (proximate) roots were in the accumulation of private debt, which took 
however different aspects in the two regions. In 2009 its pace began slowing 
down in the USA as an effect of public intervention while accelerating in Europe 
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as a public debt crisis emerged here on the top of the private debt one and 
improper policies were adopted to face them.  
In this paper we aim at two targets: i) to look for the theoretical roots of the EMU 
institutions and to check whether the current economic doctrine still supports 
them; ii) to discuss the appropriateness of these institutions and the policies 
adopted by European policymakers in order to exit the crisis, specifically with 
respect to the issues of fiscal policy and public debt. A companion paper deals 
with the way institutions nourished both the private and the public debt crisis in the 
EMU and the different reactions to the financial crisis in the USA and in the EMU 
(Acocella, 2013). 
When trying to explain the roots of the crisis a general issue of 
inappropriateness of institutions arises both sides of the Atlantic. However, in 
Europe the problems raised by the specific nature of the crisis of the private debt 
have been augmented by those of the public debt for reasons again related to the 
institutional framework. In addition, the USA institutions have proved to be more 
effective in dealing at least with the short-term effects of the crisis, whereas the 
European ones have shown their profound shortcomings. In fact, in the USA both 
fiscal and monetary policy have been active in counteracting recessionary 
impulses, with a clear Keynesian inspiration. While having this imprint, monetary 
policy has also been innovative, as it has devised various types of unconventional 
measures that have added to the traditional ones. Differently from policies in 
Washington, in the EMU, only the Frankfurt pole, i.e. monetary policy, was actively 
expansionary, even if with some hesitation, and to some extent innovative. Fiscal 
policy not only has not offered any expansionary impulse, but has acted in the 
opposite direction, showing a deflationary bias.  
This different reaction across the Atlantic is consistent with the foundations of 
the EMU institutions set up by the Maastricht Accords of the early 1990s. These 
were born out of a number of de facto circumstances, but drew support from the 
theories prevailing in the couple of decades after Friedman (1968), which had 
been widely applied in Anglo-Saxon countries in the Eighties
2
. While analyses of 
the former aspect (in terms of political relations between the different participating 
countries, their relative bargaining powers and interests, the necessities deriving 
from the impossible ‘trilogy’ and other considerations relative to the benefits of 
complementing a the single market with a single currency) are relatively 
abundant
3
, systematically relating the birth of EMU institutions to the then 
prevailing theoretical ideas is a task largely neglected in the economic literature, 
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 According to Stiglitz (2013b), ‘Much of the euro’s design reflects the neoliberal economic 
doctrines that prevailed when the single currency was conceived. It was thought that keeping 
inflation low was necessary and almost sufficient for growth and stability; that making central 
banks independent was the only way to ensure confidence in the monetary system; that low 
debt and deficits would ensure economic convergence among member countries; and that a 
single market, with money and people flowing freely, would ensure efficiency and stability.’ 
3
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aspects of the European integration see Spolaore, 2013. 
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possibly because some analysts think of the European institutional set up as of a 
‘bricolage of odds and ends’ (Collignon, 2001:25). Buti (2003) offers a first 
theoretical justification of this set up, but does not cover some aspects of this and, 
obviously, misses consideration of the new results of the past decade. Beetsma, 
Giuliodori (2010) has the advantage of a more recent viewpoint on the 
macroeconomic costs and benefits of the EMU institutional architecture, but pays 
less attention to the state of the art supporting it. Finally, Schelke (2013) is very 
good at indicating the basic theoretical roots of EMU institutions but lacks details 
and updates.  
A related exercise that is worth trying is to check the validity of the European 
institutions in the light of the developments of the literature after mid-Eighties. We 
will show that the EMU institutional design seems to be no longer justified on 
these terms, i.e. with respect to current theories, which have countered almost all 
the conclusions of monetarism and new classical macroeconomics.
4
 This is 
particularly so in the realm of fiscal policy, the value of multipliers and policies 
needed for debt consolidation for which the fallacy of conceptions popular a 
couple of decades ago has been shown. Theoretical advances are in profound 
contrast with stickiness of European institutions and the persistence of unsound 
policies. This raises the issue whether there are different explanations - in terms, 
e.g., of the opposing interests of the member states and their relative bargaining 
power - for the continuation of the old route. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. After having briefly described the 
specific evolution of the crisis in the EMU and linked it to the Eurozone’s 
institutional architecture (section 2), we trace this architecture back to the 
monetarist and new-classical macroeconomic theories that got wide acceptance 
from the end of the 1960s (section 3). In section 4 we show that in the last two 
decades or so all the pillars of such theories have been demolished, whereas the 
original EMU institutions are still there almost untouched. Critical to the existence 
of the deflationary bias of European institutions and policies were studies that 
predicated low values of income multipliers (section 5). This credence has now 
been shown to be incorrect (section 6), which no longer justifies its persistent 
influx, in particular in so far as devising policies for exiting the crisis is concerned 
(section 7). We then direct our attention to other possible explanatory factors 
(section 8). Section 9 concludes. 
 
 
2. THE CRISIS  
 
In Europe the financial crisis sprouted under forms very different from those 
characterizing the United States. This was due both to the different type of 
financial system and to the specific financial and macroeconomic imbalances 
between the different EMU countries that had loomed un-tackled: some member 
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countries, with specific structural features and higher inflation rates, experienced 
current account deficits and accumulated (private) debt towards other member 
countries. Such imbalances were built into the existence of a uniform monetary 
policy that led to differences in the real rates of interests in the presence of 
structural divergences among the member countries. The mechanism creating 
imbalances was self-reinforcing. In fact, free capital inflows and external financing 
of banks nourished a speculative boom in constructions and financial assets that 
added to inflation. Absence of common policies, such as wage and industrial 
policy, financial regulation, etc. made it possible for the bubble to grow and burst 
as soon as the financial crisis imported from the USA erupted. To save financial 
intermediaries required intervention of national governments and an increase in 
public deficits, thus threatening the whole European financial system. 
There was no sign of significant public debt tensions before the crisis, with the 
partial exception of Greece. The debt/Gdp ratio in the Union had indeed lowered. 
Tensions within the EMU exploded almost by chance – in the case of Greece, 
when the new government disclosed its predecessor's misconduct – or as a direct 
consequence of the crisis and the need for government intervention to cope with 
it, as in Ireland. Expectations of insolvency then arose. The Greek and Irish 
shocks could have been smoothly absorbed, with no domino effect, had a federal 
government – or at least some kind of coordinated expansionary fiscal action, 
instead of the constraints deriving from the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) and 
the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and 
Monetary Union (usually referred to as ‘fiscal compact’)5 – and a non-conservative 
central bank acting as a lender of last resort to governments been in place.  
Each country having to deal with the effects of private debt crisis implied that 
many countries had to expand their budget deficits
6
. But in the process, as a 
public debt crisis began to loom and as, again, the approach to this crisis was at 
the level of each country, with scarce involvement of the EMU level, each country 
took a contractionary fiscal stance. This aimed at reducing the size of the 
deficit/GDP and debt/GDP ratios and warding off insolvency, which financial 
markets related to these ratios. However, simultaneous contraction by practically 
all member countries implied an increase – rather than a reduction – in the ratios, 
as not only the numerators of the ratios, but also their denominator were 
eventually lowered, more than proportionally.  
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 As is well known, the SGP was agreed on in 1997, since the EMU was created. The fiscal 
compact, instead, was decided in 2011. 
6
 Generally speaking, an increase in private debt should trigger a build-up in government debt, 
according to the debt deflation dynamics analyzed by Fisher (1933) and Minsky (1982). As De 
Grauwe (2010: 3) notes, this occurs through two channels: first, governments relieve banks of 
their debt; and second, the public deficit increases by reason of automatic stabilizers and 
Keynesian discretionary policies. Alter, Beyer (2013) construct contagion indices based on 
measures for aggregated spillover effects. Results of their empirical estimates show growing 
interdependencies between banks and sovereigns, which represents a potential source of 
systemic risk. 
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Both the roots of the crisis and the type of policies implemented to face it lie in 
the institutional set up of the EMU. We have no enough space here to deal with 
these issues and concentrate on the theoretical sources of the EMU institutions
7
. 
 
 
3. THE THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS OF EMU INSTITUTIONS: THE VIRTUES OF MARKETS IN A CURRENCY 
UNION  
 
As seen in the previous section, the institutional architecture of the EMU has been 
characterized until recently by the existence of only one common institution, the 
ECB, and absence or weakness of other common institutions in fields such as 
financial regulation, wage policy, regional and industrial policy. The role that could 
be played by such common institutions, where the term institution is meant to refer 
to agents or ‘organisations’, is taken over by rules, i.e. institutions as a set of 
relationships or behavioral patterns of agents. The basic rule which the Union 
relies on is the market: the working of markets is intended as to offer the basic 
mechanism for regulating the economic activity within the Union. Other rules aim 
at constraining the action both of the only common public institution and of the 
countries’ governments. The former is expressed by the choice of a model of 
independent and conservative central bank. The latter by the SGP. 
In this and the following two sections we deal with these two ideas that seem to 
be central in the EMU construction: the conviction of the possibility of markets to 
solve problems, on the one side, and the need for constraining the action of public 
agents, on the other.  
By looking at the report ‘One market, one money’ (and the background studies 
prepared for it) that evaluates the benefits and costs of the EMU, one can see 
how profoundly this assessment and the track suggested for monetary unification 
were influenced by the then dominant theories (European Commission, 1990, 
1991). Buti (2003) explicitly recognizes the importance of the debate in the 1970s 
and 1980s on the EMU construction, in addition to the decisive influence of the 
national central banks, and in particular of the Bundesbank. The theoretical 
foundations of EMU institutions can thus be traced back, apart from the theory of 
optimal currency areas (OCA), to a number of analytical contributions introduced, 
mostly, since the second half of the 1960s up to mid-1980s. 
However, having to do with an array of rules that were agreed upon in a rather 
long period of time, partially as a result of compromises and bargaining, this can 
be done only in an approximate way and more than one theoretical result can 
often be linked to the real institutional architecture that has been devised. 
Therefore there are several possible rationales for this institutional set up. The 
basic idea is that benefits can be derived from the implementation of free markets. 
Simply adding a single money to a unitary market solves most problems deriving 
from the (possibly) diverging conduct of private agents and keeps undisciplined 
agents in line. However, given the power of command of public agents, the 
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ineffectiveness of their instruments as well as the potential dangers that can result 
from their use, ruling their conduct is necessary.  
The basic inspiration of EMU lies in Mundell’s (1961) approach to OCA. 
Obviously enough, both direct and indirect benefits can accrue from monetary 
unification. However, also costs can arise, especially from the point of view of 
specific countries. In order to avoid them, in the case of asymmetric shocks, some 
conditions must be fulfilled acting as a substitute of the instrument of exchange 
rate variation, which can no longer be used. An obvious condition is the existence 
of government transfers to the countries hit by such shocks from those that are 
not. In the absence of a federal state, another equilibrating mechanism, offered by 
markets could help to avoid the costs of asymmetric shocks, i.e. flexibility of 
wages and prices and/or labour mobility. 
Flexibility of prices in product markets, in principle, should be ensured by free 
circulation of goods and the elimination of non-tariff barriers deriving from the 
Single Market coming into force since January 1
st
, 1993. Other measures of 
liberalisation in the service markets would have completed the picture of free and 
open markets throughout Europe, that would lead to an optimal performance of 
the EMU. Flexibility of wages might be problematic for the reasons we will deal 
with below. If, however, the outcome of scarcely flexible wages is unemployment, 
labour mobility across countries could guarantee proper working of the labour 
market.  
Then, at least in principle, the countries adopting a single currency could have 
been ensured the possibility to avoid the costs deriving from asymmetric shocks. 
From a practical point of view, there may be an insufficient degree of flexibility in 
labour markets. Obtaining flexibility is then a requisite for the functioning of the 
monetary union and becomes a policy target
8
. 
From another point of view, the possibility for countries entering the currency 
union to ensure benefits, at no cost, by relying on well-functioning markets derives 
from the fact that each country loses an instrument (exchange rate variations), but 
is also relieved of one target (or constraint), that of current account (or, more 
generally, of the balance of payments) equilibrium (Blanchard, Giavazzi, 2002). 
An argument can be put forward that is even more in favour of participating to a 
currency union. This was first introduced with reference to participation to the 
European Monetary System (EMS) established in 1979: giving up exchange rate 
variations would introduce an external constraint favouring a virtuous conduct of 
both public and private agents. Governments of high-inflation countries would tie 
their (inflationary) hands by committing to a fixed exchange rate with lower-
inflation countries (Giavazzi, Pagano, 1988; Sibert, 1999; see also Carli, 1996). 
Thus, monetary policy would credibly
9
 be delegated to an external entity and 
private agents would no longer expect their government to inflate the economy 
                                                          
8
 ‘The original Mundell argument, of real wage flexibility as a precondition for an OCA, was thus 
turned on its head: rather than being an OCA at the beginning, Member States must 
implement deep institutional reforms in order to become an OCA’ (Schelke, 2013: 40). 
9
 The importance of the concept of credibility for understainding the foundations of the EMU will 
be clear shortly.  
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and would act consistently. As a consequence they would adjust their conduct and 
rely on instruments other than higher mark-ups to pursue their revenue or profit 
targets.
10
 
 
 
4. GOVERNMENT IS THE BEAST: FINDING THE APPROPRIATE SETTING FOR THE CENTRAL BANK 
 
In the vision of the EMU architects problems do not come from markets, which 
should indeed be freed of any obstacle (or at least of regulations and obstacles 
deriving from the government action
11
). They come from the discretionary action 
of public agents, as in each time period these tend to pursue targets that are 
unattainable in the presence of private agents having either backward- or forward-
looking expectations. In attempting to get their objectives, governments are fooled 
by the private sector, and a suboptimal outcome results. Discretionary monetary 
and fiscal policy are ineffective with respect to real variables and the first best 
desired by public agents can never be obtained, but complying to some kind of 
rules can at least ensure a second- -best outcome. 
 
 
4.1. The role of monetary policy 
 
In more technical terms, monetary policy aiming at higher employment and 
income is ineffective in the long run, when there is no trade-off between 
unemployment and inflation (the long-run Phillips curve is vertical) (Phelps, 1967; 
Friedman 1968). Thus any monetary expansion trying to reduce the ‘market’ rate 
of unemployment below the ‘natural’ one is doomed to failure and can only cause 
inflation
12
. Monetary policy should pursue a target of monetary stability, rather 
than try to influence real variables. This can explain why the ECB has been 
assigned a monetary target (price stability) instead of a dual or multiple mandate, 
as in the case of Federal Reserve. To be sure, price stability would not be the 
proper objective, as the Friedman (1969) rule must be obeyed, which should 
ensure (at least in a completely flexible price context) a zero nominal interest rate 
and a deflation rate equal to the real interest rate on safe assets
13
. The decision 
taken by the ECB to choose an inflation target less, but close to, 2% – then a 
positive one – is only apparently contrary to the Friedman rule, as in reality prices 
are not completely flexible and hedonic prices may be of some importance
14
.  
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 A note of cautiousness is however offered by Ozkan, Sibert and Sutherland (1999). 
11
 What G. Carli called “‘lacci’ and ‘lacciuoli’” (see Carli, 2003). 
12
 In any case, discretionary monetary policy can even aggravate cyclical oscillations because 
of a long and variable effect time lag. Then rules must be adhered to in monetary action 
(Friedman, 1960).  
13
 This will be relevant when it comes to explaining why the ECB has chosen an inflation target 
less, but close to, 2%. 
14
 On the relevance of price and wage adjustment costs to depart from the Friedman rule see 
Schmitt-Grohé, Uribe, 2004. 
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The issue of the independence of the ECB seems however more remote from 
Friedman’s thought. In his opinion attributing the central bank an independent 
status is a second-best option, for political as well as for economic considerations. 
In so far as the latter are concerned, rules are preferable to independence, as the 
main objectives of monetary policy are to avoid money itself to be a factor of major 
disturbances in the system and to offer a stable background for the economy
15
. It 
is true that his objections to independence refer to a situation where the central 
bank is given ‘a good deal of separate power’, whereas the ECB is governed by a 
rule (i.e. an inflation target). However, this rule must be obeyed to in the medium 
run, which implies that cyclical manipulations of the interest rate (or the monetary 
base) are not only possible, but also desirable. This is exactly the kind of 
monetary conduct Friedman wanted to avoid (Friedman, 1962). 
We must thus refer to theoretical foundations of the ECB organization and target 
other than Friedman’s thought, even if Friedman’s (1962) argument contains the 
seeds of further thought justifying an independent and conservative central bank. 
This anticipation of further developments can be linked to one of the arguments he 
makes use of, in particular, when, in the case of an independent central banker, 
he is critic of the uncertain degree and the personality of those in charge with 
monetary control, who may or may not give an assurance of a steady and firm 
conduct. This argument preludes to the assertion of the virtues of commitment 
and of a conservative central banker, which are linked to the passage from 
backward- to forward-looking expectations. 
 
 
4.2. Rational expectations, the neutrality proposition and the need for a 
conservative central bank 
 
Introduction of rational expectations (REs) led, first, to a statement of the 
ineffectiveness of monetary policy that was even more forceful than that stated by 
Friedman (Sargent and Wallace, 1975). Similarly, with rational forward looking 
expectations, fiscal policy was considered to be ineffective as an instrument for 
managing income levels (Barro, 1974), a result we will consider into detail shortly. 
A proposition of policy neutrality or policy ‘invariance’ was thus stated with regard 
to the two most important macroeconomic policy instruments. From a more 
general point of view Lucas (1976) showed that if the private sector has REs, it 
can fool any attempt by either the central bank or the government to pursue a 
given target for any real variable through the use of any instrument. 
In the same vein, any promise by governments that is time inconsistent is 
deemed to be not credible by private agents having forward-looking expectations 
(Kydland, Prescott, 1977). This result  can be avoided by self-restraint of the 
policymaker, whose temptation to cheat is balanced by a fear that he might lose 
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 Most recently, J. B. Taylor reaches very similar conclusion with respect to the issue of 
independence vs rules: ‘In the absence of a rules-based framework it appears that formal 
Federal Reserve independence does not generate good monetary policy outcomes’ (Taylor, 
2013: 17). 
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his reputation and no longer be able to act effectively, in case of repeated 
interactions with the private sector. However, in a world with uncertainty, signals 
are more difficult to interpret and then the best practical solution to the problem of 
time inconsistency is that the policymaker credibly commits to some rule (Barro, 
Gordon, 1983)
16
.  
In order to eliminate this tendency to create inflation, the inflation bias, that may 
be present in the constituency and the government, many possible rules have 
been suggested, such as those tying money growth to some macroeconomic 
indicator. An alternative is for the constituency or government to delegate 
monetary policy to a conservative central banker, i.e. a banker assigning 
employment a lower weight than the society’s or the government’s. Rogoff (1985) 
shows that this will be able to attain a lower level of inflation without reducing 
employment. However, appointing a conservative central banker introduces a 
conflict with the government that can be avoided by introducing rules that govern 
the independent monetary authority, i.e. by establishing a target conservative 
central bank (Svensson, 1997). These represent the best way for obtaining a 
commitment not to pursue inflationary, but ineffective, policies. We are thus 
(almost) back to Friedman, with two (not insignificant) details added: one is that 
rules are a way to cope with a more general problem faced by governments, that 
of their credibility: the other is that, once price stability is not in question, 
stabilization policies are possible. But this is exactly the description of the status of 
the ECB, which has to guarantee a certain inflation rate in the medium run as its 
pre-eminent target, but can also pursue other objectives, provided that these do 
not prejudge the attainment of its predominant one. 
 
 
5. AGAINST DISCRETIONARY AND CO-ORDINATED FISCAL ACTION  
 
The rules for fiscal policy set by the EMU (introduction of the responsibility for it of 
each country and no coordination among the member countries, limits to budget 
deficits and public debts) have numerous theoretical roots, apart from the need for 
commitment and adoption of rules, as an effect of time inconsistency, an 
argument that can be applied not only to monetary policy, but also to any other 
public action.  
By referring to political economy contributions, which we do in sub-section 5.1, 
one can first have an analytical justification for the assumption underlying Barro, 
Gordon’s (1983) model, according to which the government’s desired 
unemployment rate is lower than the natural one. In this way one goes to the roots 
of time inconsistency. In addition, this literature can explain the tendency towards 
accumulation of public deficit and debt. This offers an additional specific 
justification for constraints imposed on discretionary fiscal action.  
                                                          
16
 The pay-offs to a long-term player whose preferences are uncertain to his short-term 
opponent and mimicking a committed player are practically equivalent to those deriving from 
commitment (Fudenberg, Levine, 1992; Schmidt, 1993; Cripps, Thomas, 1994). 
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The ineffectiveness of this action due to ultra-rationality (Barro, 1974) and the 
low values of multipliers deriving from time inconsistency and rational 
expectations go in the same direction (see sub-section 5.2).  
Finally, the possible negative influence of coordinated fiscal action on the price 
level and the capacity of monetary counter-action, which are the object of sub-
section 5.3, justify absence of fiscal coordination and application of the principle of 
subsidiarity to this matter.  
 
 
5.1. Limiting the populistic tendencies of governments 
 
Having referred to the concepts of political conflicts, rational expectations and 
commitment for explaining the theoretical bases of the monetary policy set up in 
the EMU is useful for understanding other institutional aspects of the Union, 
namely introduction of fiscal policy rules. 
We have dealt with the conflict between monetary and fiscal authorities en 
passant, almost incidentally, in the previous section. Consideration of political 
motivations is needed in order to explain this situation not as a possible curiosum, 
but as a real one, deriving from the need to limit populistic tendencies of 
politicians who aim at maintaining or gaining power.  
These tendencies have first been explained by the school of public choice, 
starting from the idea of the political process as determined by a collection of self-
interested decisions (Buchanan, Tullock, 1962). This applies not only to 
politicians, but also to other agents. In so far as politicians are concerned, the 
attempt to maximize the length of their office (Downs 1957) or to win elections 
(Nordhaus,1975), their partisan inclinations (Hibbs, 1977; Wittman, 1977) or their 
representation of interest groups can lead them to attempt to reach a higher 
employment target than the natural one, to run budget deficits, to accumulate 
public debt, etc.
17
 This is possible if there arise principal-agent problems, as an 
effect of ‘rational ignorance’ (Downs, 1957) or asymmetric information (also Dixit, 
1996)
18
. To be sure, similar problems affect not only macroeconomic policies but 
also the provision of public goods and are particularly important if the principal is 
composed of a large group of individuals (Olson, 1965). Also the kind of electoral 
system chosen, e.g. proportional representation, or electoral uncertainty can 
exacerbate the tendency to enlarge expenditures and deficits.
19
 
The need then arises of devising rules, especially constitutional ones, to be 
decided by following a unanimity procedure. Quasi-rational individuals could agree 
to limit the temptation to draw short-run benefits and agree on such subjects as 
balanced budget rules, limits to governmental growth and transfers (Brennan, 
Buchanan, 1980; Buchanan, Brennan, 1981). One could thus explain both the 
                                                          
17
 A rather complete review of the political economy literature in the years before the late 1980s 
is in Tabellini, Alesina (1988). The most notable exception in their survey is the ‘public choice’ 
literature. Alesina, Tabellini (1990) explain the bias to accumulating deficits and debt.  
18
 As is well known, the literature on asymmetric information was inaugurated by Akerlof (1970). 
19
 There is a wide literature on the subject (see Arnott, 2006).  
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reason why the SGP was required to be constitutionally grounded (Inman, 1996)
20
 
and the recent provision of the fiscal compact according to which constitutional 
rules constraining discretionary fiscal policy should be passed. 
In addition, this literature gives support to transferring some decisions to 
institutions not plagued by time inconsistency and opportunistic behavior to 
acquire credible commitment by delegating some decisions to agents with 
different time preferences or with incentive structures different from those of 
politicians as in the case of independent central banks (De Haan, Sturm, 1992, 
Cukierman, 1994, Akhtar, 1995) and independent authorities (Majone, 1994, 
1996). 
 
 
5.2. Ineffectiveness of fiscal policy: low value of multipliers 
 
The neoclassical and New Keynesian approach
21
 that incorporate some sort of 
Barro-Ricardo (consumption smoothing) effect – and thus assert a low value of 
multipliers – tend to suggest fiscal policy ineffectiveness for expansionary 
purposes and, in the case of a crisis, the need for fiscal contraction. Even in these 
neoclassical and New Keynesian models, separable utility, deep habits 
consumption, rule-of-thumb consumers, spending reversals could restore positive 
and significant Keynesian-like effects of public spending increases on output 
(Hebous, 2010). In the absence of such mechanisms some kind of Barro-Ricardo 
effect would not only imply ineffectiveness of Keynesian policies, but also suggest 
the need for fiscal consolidation, under the form either of a reduction in 
expenditures or of a rise in taxes
22
. This suggestion would be strengthened 
considering also the negative long term effect of debt on growth.  
Indeed, some empirical researches found a positive effect of government 
expenditure cuts both in a short- and a long-run perspective. This was the 
conclusion of Giavazzi, Pagano (1990), who explained the positive effects on 
consumption of the cuts of the 1980s in the Danish and Irish public expenditure as 
deriving from households’ expectations of permanent cuts in the level of 
government budget. Along similar lines followed Alesina, Perotti (1995a, 1997), 
Giavazzi, Pagano (1996)
23
. The negative effect of the debt on growth had been 
stated – long before Reinhart, Rogoff (2010), Checherita, Rother, 2010; and 
Kumar, Woo (2010) –by Modigliani (1961), Diamond (1965), Saint-Paul (1992). 
                                                          
20
 This was not the real outcome for the SGP, and constitutionalisation of the fiscal rules has to 
wait until the fiscal compact, whose enforcement could also be ensured by the European 
Court of Justice.  
21
 The New Keynesian approach emerged first at the beginning of the 1990s, but it was not until 
the 2000s that it was refined in a way as to allow for some positive real effect of fiscal policy. 
Then it had no practical influence on EMU institutions different from that of other neoclassical 
theories. 
22
 Fiscal consolidation has limited relevance in the SGP but will be a central aspect of the ‘fiscal 
compact’. 
23
 More recently, see Barro, Redlick (2009), Alesina, Ardagna (1998, 2010), Broadbent, Daly 
(2010). 
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This ‘fin de siècle’ credo of low or negative values of multipliers and of negative 
effects on growth deriving from the accumulation of debt was certainly not in 
favour of traditional Keynesian fiscal action and imbalances and can be thought as 
influencing the draft of the EMU institutional set up. In addition, it has also inspired 
the idea of an expansionary fiscal consolidation (the doctrine of ‘expansionary 
austerity’) that has been at the basis of exit policies from the crisis (see section 7).   
In this perspective it is not strange that active fiscal policy had been put in 
plaster by the SGP and (more recently) the European fiscal compact has been 
agreed on. But these limitations on discretionary fiscal policy cannot be fully 
understood without considering open economies explicitly, in the context of other 
European institutions, which we do in the following sub-section. 
 
5.3. Inefficiency and negative spillovers of fiscal policy coordination 
 
Theoretical models of open economies are of specific interest to us. In this 
context, the impact of budget policies on the real exchange rate plays an 
important role in determining the size of the multiplier effect, as this could be 
increased by the real exchange rate depreciation
24
. Also other effects must be 
taken into account in an open economy, such as existence of incomplete 
international financial markets (Kollman, 2009) and the possibility of a home bias 
in consumption (Ravn, Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe, 2007): both increase the 
expansionary impact of public expenditure. In an open-economy context also 
positive spillover effects operating via trade have a special interest. Beetsma et al. 
(2006, 2009, 2011) explore the international spillovers from fiscal policy shocks in 
Europe. A fiscal expansion stimulates domestic activity, which leads to more 
foreign exports and, hence, higher foreign output. Erceg, Gust and Lopez Salido 
(2007) and Spilimbergo, Symansky, Blanchard and Cottarelli (2008) argue in fact 
that fiscal coordination increases multiplier effects. 
Some of these effects are scarcely relevant in the context of the EMU. In fact, 
changes in the real exchange rate are possible only to the extent to which the 
price level can be lowered in the country with an expansionary fiscal policy, which 
contradicts what one should expect to happen in a monetary union. Also the home 
bias is limited in the EU in so far as the effect of national protectionist policies is 
concerned, as both trade and non-trade barriers were drastically lifted. In fact, the 
income multiplier is reduced by the high value of the propensity to import from 
other EU countries. This high propensity, instead, while having a negative impact 
on expansionary fiscal action in one country only, would per se support a 
coordinated fiscal action.  
                                                          
24
 The possibility of this outcome is investigated by: Frankel, Razin (1987), who assume tax 
financing of public expenditures and an exogenous supply of money; Obstfeld, Rogoff (1995), 
who consider circumstances leading to an interest rate reduction, namely short-run price 
rigidities and consumption smoothing; Corsetti, Meier and Muller (2009), who point to 
expectations of a systematic reduction over time of future government spending that preclude 
a real interest rate rise 
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This conclusion misses interactions between fiscal and monetary policies, which 
have an impact on the nature and the value of spillovers and fiscal multipliers. In a 
monetary union such as the EMU assigning monetary authorities the primary 
target of price stability implies a negative spillover of fiscal policy: in fact, any 
expansionary fiscal action by one country has an impact on the union’s price level 
and thus calls for a deflationary intervention by the ECB. Beetsma, Bovenberg 
(1998), Beetsma, Uhlig (1999), Beetsma et al. (2001)
25
, while using different 
modelling approaches,
26
 all find negative effects on income from fully-coordinated 
fiscal expansion, due to the deflationary reaction of the central bank.  
According to Beetsma, Bovenberg (1998), in a monetary union such as the 
EMU, time inconsistency provides the rationale for a conservative central bank 
and against the coordination of national fiscal policies. In fact, in their analysis, the 
system suffers from both a spending bias and an inflation bias and thus faces a 
trade-off between them. By adjusting either monetary or fiscal institutions, not 
both, only a suboptimal outcome can result. Monetary unification enhances the 
strategic position of the monetary authority and introduces a disciplinary effect on 
governments. Fiscal coordination would eliminate this disciplinary effect and 
worsen the strategic position of the central bank. The need for introducing 
subsidiarity in fiscal policymaking is thus asserted. 
The only problem left is then whether existence of a committed central bank 
alone and national fiscal authorities can avoid the negative effects on price 
stability of free-riding by the latter
27
 or if other institutions are needed to 
complement the type of central bank that has been chosen. Beetsma, Uhlig 
(1999) claim that a pact of the kind of the SGP can reduce the negative spillovers 
arising from political distortions that can be exacerbated in a monetary union.
28
 
Beetsma, Uhlig (1999) give two possible justifications for constraining the action of 
national fiscal policy: one refers to a country, closed or open, which wants to draft 
a fiscal constitutional rule in order to tie the hands of its own government, based 
on the arguments developed in sub-section 5.1); the other lies in the existence, in 
a monetary union, of negative spillovers deriving from a country’s budgetary policy 
and accumulation of debt on the common inflation rate.  
The same problem, i.e. sufficiency of a committed central bank for ensuring 
price stability, has been investigated from another point of view. The ‘unpleasant 
monetarist arithmetic’ of Sargent, Wallace (1981) held first the view of the 
insufficiency of a monetary policy rule for price stability, due to rational 
expectations. Given this kind of expectations, bond financing of public 
expenditures and tight money could give rise to immediate inflation. Along similar 
                                                          
25
 And, more recently, Beetsma (2008), Beetsma, Giuliodori (2010), Michalak, Engwerda and 
Plasmans (2009). 
26
 Michalak, Engwerda and Plasmans (2009) use a New Keynesian model in continuous time, 
whereas the other papers cited do not use micro-founded models. 
27
 See also, more recently, Chari, Kehoe (2007, 2008). 
28
 This issue is reviewed at length in Beetsma, Giuliodori (2010: section 7). 
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lines Woodford (1996) applied the fiscal theory of the price level
29
 to the case of 
the EMU and, in the absence of fiscal self-discipline of governments, found that it 
supported introduction of limits to public deficit and debt as a way to complement 
the monetary rule chosen by the common central bank – or even to set up a 
precondition for this bank to be charged with maintaining price stability.  
A final justification for setting limits to national fiscal policy in the context of a 
common monetary system was suggested by Casella (1989): a country’s fiscal 
deficit has negative spillovers on the interest rates and the bonds’ prices of the 
area and should then be limited.  
Then, in the years preceding the constitution of the EMU the rationales were laid 
for advocating rules setting constraints to discretionary fiscal policy. These were:  
1. time inconsistency; 
2. political economy considerations about the attempts of governments to force 
the unemployment rate below the natural one; 
3. ineffectiveness of fiscal action, with possibly negative multipliers and effects 
of accumulated public debt on growth; 
4. negative spillovers on the real interest rates abroad; 
5. negative spillovers on the price level, aggravated by policy coordination and 
the ensuing monetary policy counter-reaction.  
The SGP was only the legal transposition of such statements, reflecting the idea 
that the true problems of the EMU set up were not only that of designing an 
independent and conservative central bank but also of ensuring that no harm 
could derive from fiscal policy
30
.  
 
 
6. RIP VAN WINKLE AND THE REBUTTAL OF THE THEORETICAL CONVICTIONS OF THE 1970S AND 1980S 
 
6.1. Disproving the basic theoretical convictions underlying the EMU institutions 
 
Only a few economists and observers
31
 warned at the time about – or have 
pointed out later – the fragility or the limits of this project. Almost a decade ago 
Alan Blinder claimed that ‘a sharp revision of the naively optimistic views (about 
the capacity of economic policy to control the economy) held by some economists 
circa 1966 was called for. But … the pendulum may have swung just a bit too far‘ 
                                                          
29
 The theory had been developed by Leeper (1991), Sims (1994). For a critique see Buiter 
(2002). 
30
 Buti (2003: 5) quotes Mervyn King as saying that the real obsession of central bankers is not 
inflation but fiscal policy (King, 1995). 
31
 See Eichengreen, Frieden (2000). For the practical absence of anti-cyclical policies and the 
limitation of the European budget see Buiter, Corsetti, Roubini (1993). For perverse incentives 
leading to self-realizing speculative attack created by the Maastricht Treaty see Eichengreen, 
Wyplosz (1993); on the compromises between different positions leading to the Treaty see 
Bini Smaghi, Padoa Schioppa, Papadia (1994); on the issue of coordination between 
monetary and fiscal policy see also the largely or partly critical contributions by Bryson (1994), 
Allsopp, Vines (1996), Dixit, Lambertini (2001), Onorante (2006). 
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(Blinder, 2004: 26), producing a similar naively optimistic views about the virtues 
of markets and the central bank conservativeness. 
Blinder’s words are even more actual nowadays as economic theory has further 
questioned the system of beliefs that had emerged in the fifteen-twenty years or 
so after 1966, even if it still retains some assumptions that led to the propositions 
featuring that credo. Three decades later, Rip van Winkle’s32 faith in the credo 
would again be crowded out by the analytical developments intervened in these 
years. Think of: the limited practical relevance of the surprise effect, recognized by 
Lucas (1996: 679) himself; the irrelevance of many critiques to the ‘classical’ 
theory of economic policy (in particular, Tinbergen’s ‘golden rule’ about controlling 
the economy) based on rational expectations (Blinder, 1998: 8; Acocella, Di 
Bartolomeo, Hughes Hallett, 2012
33
); the theoretical and practical limits to time 
inconsistency and thus to related prescriptions of monetary policy rules that 
should replace discretionary action (Blinder, 1998: 56); existence of a long-run 
non vertical Phillips curve (Hughes Hallett, 2000; Graham, Snower, 2008; 
Benigno, Ricci, 2011; Acocella, Di Bartolomeo, Tirelli, 2013); the need for more 
active fiscal policy and regulation (especially of financial markets and 
institutions
34
) once some unrealistic assumptions of current models are ruled 
out
35
; critique of the arguments put forward by Rogoff (1985) (and Bade, Parkin, 
1978 before him) advanced by Posen (1994) and Hayo (1998), who highlight that 
both political independence and inflation are the outcome of structural economic 
and social factors that make the central bank statutes to have no impact on 
inflation; empirical findings suggesting that countries that adopt inflation targeting 
have not attained better monetary policy performance relative to a control group of 
highly successful non-inflation targeters (Mishkin, Schmidt-Hebbel, 2007); sub-
optimality of a conservative central bank in a monetary union with active trade 
                                                          
32
 Rip van Winkle is the character created by Washington Irvin and evoked by Gordon (1976) 
who made a terrible ‘environmental’ mistake awaking up in the republican America, after 
sleeping for twenty-years, by declaring himself a devote subject of King George III.  
33
 Public action can be facilitated by rational expectations. In what circumstances this can 
happen depends on the number of targets and that of the instruments available to the 
government and the private sector (Acocella, Di Bartolomeo, Hughes Hallett, 2012). When the 
policymaker has a sufficient number of instruments available he can make use of appropriate 
announcements of future policies (e.g., to exercise what the Federal Reserve calls ‘forward 
guidance’: see Woodford, 2007, 2008; Williams, 2011) in order to pursue its targets in a 
shorter period of time.  
34
 Europe and the USA have slowly moved to introduce tough regulation in this field. 
Remarkable is the new position of the IMF, which now advocates exceptional and limited 
direct controls of capital movements, reversing the pro free market position adopted in the 
previous 40 years (IMF, 2012). 
35 
We refer to the assumptions that lead to full inter-temporal consumption smoothing – such as 
perfect foresight or rational expectations, infinitely-living agents, altruism, absence of liquidity 
constraint, etc. – and limit effectiveness of fiscal policy. As to the possible negative impact on 
real activity of imperfections in financial markets, see Bernanke, Gertler (1989, 1990); 
Greenwald, Stiglitz (1988, 1990, 1993), Kiyotaki, Moore (1997, 2002); Bernanke, Gertler, 
Gilchrist (1999) and a lot more recent contributions. 
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unions (Acocella, Di Bartolomeo and Tirelli, 2007a; 2007b);
 36
 critique of the 
Friedman rule and the need for an inflation target well above zero (Tirelli, Di 
Bartolomeo and Acocella, 2010)
37
.  
We have omitted from the above sketch of the reversal in most convictions of 
some decades ago any mention of issues concerning the effects of fiscal 
variables. This is not because they are scarcely relevant. Quite the contrary, they 
deserve specific attention, as they had an influence not only on the initial 
institutional set up, and thus on the management of the public debt crisis,
38
 but 
also, more recently, on the strengthening of previous rules (the introduction of a 
fiscal compact), that might prelude to further problems in the future. The next sub-
section will deal with the former issue. We defer discussion of the latter to section 
7. 
 
 
6.2. The issue of multipliers and fiscal policy 
 
Doubts with respect to some tenets of the assertion of very low spending and tax 
multipliers were first raised by Blanchard, Perotti (2002), which gave a 
substantially Keynesian answer to the issue of the effects of tax and expenditure 
increases on income. In fact, they found that the former have a contractionary 
effect, while the latter have an expansionary one. The authors did not engage in a 
discussion about debt consolidation strategies, but one could hardly assert that, 
on the basis of their findings a policy of expenditure reductions and (to a less 
extent) of tax increases, while certainly contributing to the reduction of the 
numerator of the debt/GDP ratio, would give an impulse to the denominator. 
Instead, their findings might support a Keynesian-type attitude of debt 
consolidation not based on a budget contraction, at least in so far as the effects 
on income are concerned. 
Again, of specific relevance are some analyses that take account of open 
economies (in some cases the EMU) and spillover effects. In order to quantify 
these effects, Coenen, Wieland (2002) constructed a small macro-econometric 
model of the USA, the Euro area and Japan and found that international spillovers 
                                                          
36
 The validity of the conclusions of Beetsma, Bovenberg (1998) strictly depends on their 
assumption of absence of labour markets distortions (Acocella, Di Bartolomeo and Tirelli, 
2007b). More specifically, when trade unions operate fiscal coordination ensures better 
outcomes with a conservative central bank, while being detrimental with a populist one 
(Acocella, Di Bartolomeo and Tirelli, 2007a), which is paradoxical with respect to the 
institutional arrangements of the EMU. 
37
 To be sure, there are analysts thinking that after thirty years of successful anti-inflationary 
action by central banks, the advantages of anchoring businesses and households’ 
expectations at price stability should not be lost (Kohn, 2010). Accepting the argument of the 
beneficial effects of anchoring inflation expectation, however, does not rule out choosing a 
moderately higher inflation rate target, as this would not impair expectations anchoring, while 
having a significant positive impact on unemployment and growth, especially in the EMU. 
38
 Think of prescriptions for the management of the crisis and the conditions imposed on 
countries in need of financial assistance from the EMU and the IMF. 
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of domestic shocks turn out to be rather small when exchange rates are flexible 
and short-term interest rates are set according to policy rules that focus on 
stabilizing domestic variables. Beetsma et al. (2006) combined a panel VAR 
model in government spending, net taxes and GDP with a panel trade model. 
They found that a public spending increase (tax reduction) equal to 1% of GDP 
implies 2.3% (0.6%) more foreign exports over the first two years, on average. If 
Germany initiates such budget change, the effect on the GDP of its trading 
partners is 0.23% (0.06%) over the first two years. These figures are likely to 
indicate lower bounds for the effects that will actually occur (Beetsma et al., 2006). 
Beetsma et al. (2008) found that a 1% of GDP public spending impulse produces 
a 1.2% output rise on impact and a 1.6% peak response of output. In addition, 
rising imports and falling exports together produce an impact fall of the trade 
balance of 0.5% of GDP and a peak fall of 0.8% of GDP. The public budget 
moves into a deficit of 0.7% of GDP on impact. Similar results are in Beetsma, 
Giuliodori’s (2011)39 estimation of the effects of government purchases on income 
in open European economies, which are higher than one on average in the short- 
to medium-run. The public and trade balance deteriorate. Even if the value of the 
multiplier is greater than one, it is reduced in open economies because of 
leakages. This strengthens the rationale behind a concerted fiscal expansion 
among European countries and, by contrast, implies that decisions to introduce 
fiscal discipline – either independently decided by a country or imposed by some 
common rule – have cumulative negative effects that may impair reaching the 
target of a reduction in the debt/GDP ratio.  
Recent analyses have shown that the value of multipliers is strictly dependent 
on the time of reference of the effects as well as on the state of the economy. 
A rather complete and detailed empirical analysis of the effects of fiscal 
consolidation is in IMF (2010), which takes account of numerous aspects of the 
effects of fiscal consolidation policies: in particular, their timing (i.e., whether they 
are short- or long-term), the monetary policy stance, the expansionary or 
contractionary nature of budget policies of other countries. Its conclusion is that, 
first, ‘the idea that fiscal austerity triggers faster growth in the short term finds little 
support in the data. Fiscal retrenchment typically has contractionary short-term 
effects on economic activity, with lower output and higher unemployment…, (but) 
fiscal consolidation is likely to be beneficial over the long term’. In addition, a 
budget cut is the less expansionary the lower the interest rate (as monetary policy 
has little room for partially accommodating their deflationary effects), the lower the 
likelihood of a currency depreciation and the less expansionary are the policies of 
other countries, which gives little scope for raising net export.  
Of a similar nature is the result of more recent theoretical and empirical 
research. Some point out that smoother fiscal consolidations are more successful 
than stiffer ones (Batini, Callegari, Melina, 2012). Other studies stress the efficacy 
of fiscal policy in severely depressed economies when central banks do not offset 
its effects (DeLong, Summers, 2012). Blanchard, Leigh (2013). More generally, 
                                                          
39
 This paper also offers a good review of the results of existing empirical tests. 
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fiscal multipliers are shown to be asymmetric and regime-dependent, ‘being 
stronger in recessions than in expansions, in particular in presence of financial 
market stress, so that contractionary effects can become very severe when fiscal 
consolidations are pursued’ (Semmler, Semmler, 2013: 2), as an effect either of 
some economies being locked in a bad equilibrium (De Grauwe, 2011) or of 
macroeconomic non-linearities (Semmler, Semmler, 2013). This result is 
confirmed by the analysis of seven structural DSGE models used for policy action 
as well as two academic DSGE models (Coenen et al, 2012). The analysis shows, 
however, that a permanent fiscal stimulus implies lower values of the initial 
multipliers and a negative impact on income in the long run. Finally, 
Papadimitriou, Nikiforos and Zezza (2013) find a multiplier of 2.5, capable of 
explaining the failure of the ‘Troika’ expansionary contraction prescriptions for 
Greece. 
These findings have important consequences for our topic, in so far as both 
institutional and short run implications are concerned. We will briefly deal with the 
former in the next sub-section and with the latter in section 7.  
 
 
6.3. Inconsistency of the EMU institutions and alternative institutions 
 
The high value of multipliers in open economies strengthens the rationale behind 
a concerted fiscal expansion among European countries and, by contrast, imply 
that decisions to introduce fiscal discipline – either decentralized of imposed by 
some common rule such as the SGP – have cumulative negative effects that may 
impair reaching the target of a reduction in the deficit and debt/GDP ratios, at least 
in the short run. By paraphrasing Auerbach, Gorodnichenko’s (2012: 17) words, 
coordinated ‘fiscal activism may be more valuable than previously thought’. 
In addition, the foundations of the SGP (later on, also of the fiscal compact) are 
weakened by reconsideration of the issue of the relationship between fiscal and 
monetary action in the Union. We have seen above that the validity of the 
conclusions of Beetsma, Bovenberg (1998) strictly depends on their assumption 
of absence of labour markets distortions (Acocella, Di Bartolomeo and Tirelli, 
2007b). More specifically, when trade unions operate, fiscal coordination ensures 
better outcomes with a conservative central bank, while being detrimental with a 
populist one (Acocella, Di Bartolomeo and Tirelli, 2007a), which is paradoxical 
with respect to the institutional arrangements of the EMU. 
 
 
7. INSTITUTIONS AND POLICIES IN TIME OF CRISIS: SHORT- AND LONG-RUN EFFECTS OF FISCAL 
CONSOLIDATION  
 
Variability and regime-dependency of multipliers make it necessary to distinguish 
between the different possible aims of fiscal action. If the aim is that of expanding 
the economy, a short-run multiplier larger than one is enough to suggest the need 
for an expansionary fiscal action. This should have no negative effect on the 
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deficit- and debt-to-Gdp ratios, in the short run. On the contrary, the effect on 
these should be positive. Thus the idea of an expansionary fiscal consolidation 
(the doctrine of ‘expansionary austerity’) that was at the basis of exit policies from 
the crisis in Japan in 1996 and more recently in the EMU has been disproved the 
‘new’ conventional wisdom among economists that inspired a number of policy 
attitudes and interventions in the last couple of decades 
Variability of multipliers does not guarantee, however, that the effect of fiscal 
expansion is positive also in the long run. In so far as this context is considered, a 
necessary and sufficient condition for an expansionary fiscal consolidation to lead 
to a reduced debt/Gdp ratio in the long run is that the multiplier is higher than the 
inverse of this ratio (Cozzi, 2013; Nuti, 2013). This is especially good news for 
highly indebted countries, as it widens the range of the values of multipliers that 
make for expansionary fiscal policy to reduce the debt/Gdp ratio. For a country 
such as Italy, a value higher than .7 would be enough to suggest a fiscal 
expansionary action as an instrument of fiscal ‘consolidation’. However, one must 
be sure that the multiplier considered is a long-run, not a short-run, one. 
This may not be the case for Italy, and – changing what needs to be changed – 
for other European countries as well. However, a two-stage exit strategy could be 
followed within the EMU. In the first stage, a coordinated fiscal stimulus could 
raise the Union’s GDP and alleviate the negative effects of the crisis. As the 
positive effects of the stimulus fade away, the phase of consolidating public debt 
could follow, either through more traditional policies or by revising other aspects of 
the EMU institutional set-up
40
.  
 
 
8. WHY ARE EUROPEAN POLICYMAKERS STILL SLAVES OF ECONOMIC THEORIES FASHIONABLE IN THE 
SEVENTIES? PHYSIOLOGICAL LAGS AND PERVERSE TIES.  
 
Differently from the United States, neither the theoretical progress of the 1990s 
and the following decade nor the depth of the crisis that has hit the EMU countries 
have produced a substantial change in the institutional architecture of EMU and 
current policy attitudes. The deflationary bias of the former has even been 
stressed by introducing a ‘fiscal compact’. 41   
Policy actions only partly depend on economic theory. There are a number of 
factors explaining why theoretical innovations may not translate into adopted 
policies (see, e.g., Galbraith, 1987). Vested interests and some autonomy in the 
dynamics of political orientations can contribute to that.  
                                                          
40
 An issue different from that of the effects of the value of multipliers for the desirability of a 
contractionary or an expansionary fiscal stance is that of the effects of the debt/gdp ratio on 
optimal growth. On this issue, see Checherita, Hughes Hallett, Rother (2014).  
41
 From this point of view Rip van Winkle would certainly not be hit by the institutional changes 
introduced in the EMU. He could still declare himself a convinced supporter of the theories 
asserted by Friedman or Barro, Lucas, Sargent Wallace, without repeating an ‘environmental’ 
mistake. 
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Hinting at the role of interests of different EMU countries may be useful. 
Germany has created a system powerful enough not to suffer from the 
deflationary bias of the EMU institutions, because of the real devaluation it 
operated since the 1990s, in particular in the early 2000s, and its ability to build a 
successful system to compete in Europe (and to some extent outside the area). 
By contrast, peripheral countries (most of the PIIGS) still think that they may draw 
some profit from the external constraint of fixed exchange rates and other EMU 
institutions. They might like reforming some of these institutions but are not 
powerful enough to counter German opposition. This help explain why they 
accepted a number of institutional changes, among which the incredibly 
asymmetric provisions of the Macroeconomic imbalance procedure introduced in 
2011, which has been tailored to the German interests
42
. Fragmentation between 
the different European countries is thus rising, even if it appears to be repressed, 
until now. 
The performance of EMU countries since the institution of the euro has been 
worse than that of European non-EMU countries at a comparable stage of 
development (i.e., Denmark, Sweden and UK), in terms not only of the 
unemployment rate and the GDP rate of growth, but also of inflation. These 
countries benefitted from flexible exchange rates and, in the case of the Bank of 
England, don’t have a political independent and conservative central bank. To be 
fair, the economic performance of non-EMU countries had been already better 
before 1999, but the EMU has only succeeded in reducing the gap in terms of 
price stability, at the expenses of higher growth- and unemployment-rate gaps 
(see table 1).  
 
Table 1. A comparison of growth, unemployment and inflation rates, EMU and 
European non-EMU countries, 1991-2012 
 
GDP % growth rates at constant prices  1991-98 1999-2012 
   EMU      1.8       1.3 
   DK, SW, UK      1.9       1.7 
Unemployment rates (%)   
   EMU     10.4       8.9 
   DK, SW, UK       7.9       6.0 
Inflation rates (Consumer price index, %)   
   EMU       3.1       2.1 
   DK, SW, UK         2.6       2.0 
Source: European Commission (2013 and various years)   
 
The most recent economic evolution and the depth of the crisis seem to have an 
influence on political attitudes. The level of unemployment is still climbing 
everywhere in Europe. France, the Netherlands and other formerly virtuous 
countries are facing rather serious difficulties that have led also to a deterioration 
                                                          
42
 Bibow is very specific in that. See in particular Bibow (2012: 25, footnote 5). 
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of the deficit/GDP ratio. A very dangerous situation is thus emerging that might be 
a prelude to a vast authoritarian attitude throughout Europe. This might help 
explain why Germany could accept some attenuation of its tough stance.  
 
 
9. INSTITUTIONS, EXIT POLICIES AND THE ‘GREAT RECESSION’: SOME LESSONS AS A WAY OF CONCLUSIONS 
The evolution of economic thought can contribute to explain the differences 
between the policies that were adopted on the two sides of the Atlantic through its 
influence on the respective institutions. American institutions were to some extent 
influenced by Keynesian thought and the innovations introduced in the decades 
immediately following the second half of the 1960s had an impact mainly on actual 
policies, not on the institutional framing. The Employment Act of 1946 made 
promoting employment a target of the Federal government. In so far as monetary 
policy is concerned, the Federal Reserve Reform Act of 1977 added the dual 
mandate of ensuring employment together with price stability to the original target 
of preserving financial stability
43
, thus not being much influenced by the diffuse 
concern over inflation and the theoretical innovations of those years. By contrast, 
EMU institutions were built under the influence of those innovations.  
Time has passed which should have led to a radical change of most of the still 
current institutional architecture, but a sort of hysteresis is in place. This has a 
number of possible explanations, such as those underlined by Galbraith (1987). 
However, in order to explain it one should refer not only to normal and 
physiological lags, but also the opposing interests, the value judgments and 
visions prevailing in some European countries and the dominant role of Germany, 
which conveys them. 
Beyond differences between the USA and the EMU, however, some common 
issues arising from the effects of the crisis and the policies adopted to tame it 
should be stressed. Both new risks and new opportunities arise. 
First, the current level of long-term interest rates is presently negative (Turner, 
2012: 11) as an effect of the liquidity glut. This raises the risk of speculative 
bubbles. Interest rates will certainly increase in the near future. If this does not 
take place smoothly, financial risks will arise threatening again the real economy.  
At the same time, negative long-term interest rates are the effect of the huge 
amount of long-term government bonds held by central banks as a consequence 
of their unconventional operations. This empowers central banks with an 
additional policy tool to control expectations and choose among multiple equilibria 
by targeting both short- and long-term interest rates (Adão et al, 2011)
44
. 
It is certainly difficult to manage policy action and revive economic prospects in 
a situation where interest rates hit the zero-lower boundary and the debt/Gdp 
ratios are climbing. Devising new policies or re-discovering old routes as a way to 
cope with the new situation is a challenging prospect. Slightly rising the current 
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 For a review of possible consequences of these operations see International Monetary Fund 
(2013). 
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inflationary targets, redistributing wealth, adopting a co-ordinated expansionary 
policy design, both within countries (regions) and among them, are some of the 
most obvious such policies. 
The reasons for co-ordinated policy action should be stressed and detailed. First 
the dividing line between fiscal and monetary policy has been blurred (Iwata, 
2012) and the reasons in favour of political independence of central banks and for 
assigning them an anti-inflationary target seem to be much less founded now than 
some decades ago. In addition, as shown before, the advantages of their political 
independence have largely failed to materialize in practice, as the performance of 
the economy in countries with independent and conservative central banks has 
not been better than elsewhere. Moreover, high debt/Gdp ratios can make 
independent monetary policy financially destabilizing. For this reason, in 
particular, central banks cannot be assigned the function of a lender of last resort 
for the private sector while being excluded from a similar function in favour of the 
public sector. Finally, policy decentralization consistent with the appropriate 
assignment of instruments to targets fails to produce net benefits ‘in a complex 
non-linear system with risk — including instrument uncertainty – and where one is 
concerned not just with the ultimate equilibrium (which in practice may never be 
attained) but with real-time performance, one should use all the instruments at 
one's disposal, and coordination among policymakers is essential’ (Stiglitz, 2013a: 
15).  
Co-ordinated policy action has an international counterpart. Globalization has 
made international linkages more copious and stronger. On the one side, this has 
generally reduced the effectiveness of national policies. On the other, the need for 
international co-operation has increased. Defection from agreed targets is always 
advantageous, more so for small countries, but larger countries have powerful 
weapons to discourage it. The true problem lies in the interests pressing for free 
trade and capital movements inside these countries.  
Some of the previous considerations are of special relevance in the case of the 
EMU. The list of targets attributed to the existing institutions needs no addition, 
but the weights attached to each of them should certainly be revised, beginning 
with the ECB targets. As to instruments, a lot are missing, notably active, co-
ordinated (across states) fiscal policy as well as common industrial policy and 
labour policy, i.e. all the instruments that empower a federal state. A final notation 
has to do with improper assignment of instrument to targets, that of monetary 
policy for structural changes (Hetzel, 2013)
45
, which was the unsuccessful way 
devised by the founders of the EMU for coping with the structural differences 
existing among the member countries. 
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 A parallel could be drawn with the Federal Reserve’s improper attempt to offset the negative 
effects of growing inequality by lowering interest rates and relaxing regulations, thereby 
helping create a housing bubble (Stiglitz, 2013). In the case of the Fed, at least the set of 
statutory targets is larger than that of the ECB. Then the latter’s attempt to pursue structural 
targets is even more striking. 
 
 
24 
 
REFERENCES 
 
Acocella N. (2013), A tale of two cities: The evolution of the crisis and exit policies in 
Washington and Frankfurt, mimeo 
Acocella N., G. Di Bartolomeo and A. Hughes Hallett (2012), The theory of economic 
policy in a strategic context, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Acocella N., G. Di Bartolomeo and P. Tirelli (2007a), Fiscal leadership and coordination in 
the EMU, ‘Open Economies Review’, 18(3): 281-9. 
Acocella N., G. Di Bartolomeo and P. Tirelli (2007b), Monetary conservatism and fiscal 
coordination in a monetary union, ‘Economics Letters’, 94: 56-63. 
Acocella N., G. Di Bartolomeo and P. Tirelli (2013), Trend inflation, the labor market 
wedge, and the non-vertical Phillips curve, ‘Journal of Policy Modeling’, forthcoming. 
Adão, B., I. Correia and P. Teles (2011), Short and long interest rate targets, mimeo, 
November 
Akerlof, G. A. (1970), The market for 'lemons': Quality uncertainty and the market 
mechanism, ‘Quarterly Journal of Economics’, 84(3): 488–500. 
Alesina A., R. Perotti (1995a), Fiscal expansions and fiscal adjustments in OECD 
countries, ‘Economic Policy’, 10(21): 205–248. 
Alesina A., R. Perotti (1995b), The political economy of budget deficit, ‘IMF Staff Papers’, 
42: 1-31. 
Alesina A., R. Perotti (1997), Fiscal adjustments in OECD countries: Composition and 
macroeconomic effects, ‘IMF Staff Papers’, 44: 210–48. 
Alesina A., S. Ardagna (1998), Tales of fiscal adjustment, ‘Economic Policy’, 13(27): 487–
545. 
Alesina A., S. Ardagna (2010), Large changes in fiscal policy: Taxes versus spending, in 
J.R. Brown (ed.), Tax policy and the economy, Vol. 24, Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
National Bureau of Economic Research. 
Alesina A., G. Tabellini (1990), A positive theory of fiscal deficits and government debt in a 
democracy, ‘Review of Economic Studies’, 57: 403-14. 
Allsopp C., D. Vines (1996), Fiscal policy and EMU, National Institute Economic Review, 
158(1):  91-107  
Alter A., A. Beyer (2013), The dynamics of spillover effects during the European sovereign 
debt turmoil, February, http://ssrn.com/abstract=2168659 
Annott A. (2006), Enforcement of the Stability and Growth Pact: How fiscal policy did and 
did not change under Europe’s fiscal framework,  IMF W. P N. 116 
Auerbach A. J., Y. Gorodnichenko (2012), Output spillovers from fiscal policy, NBER, W.P. 
18578, November 
Balassa B. (1964), The purchasing power parity doctrine: A reappraisal, ‘Journal of 
Political Economy’, 72: 584-596. 
Bade R., M. Parkin (1978), Central bank laws and monetary policies: A preliminary 
investigation. The Australian monetary system in the 1970s, in M. Porter (ed.), The 
Australian Monetary System in the 1970s, Clayton, Monash University  
Barro R. J. (1974), Are government bonds net wealth?, ‘Journal of Political Economy’, 82: 
1095-1117. 
 
 
25 
 
Barro, R. J., D. Gordon (1983), Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary 
policy, ‘Journal of Monetary Economics’, 12: 101-120. 
Barro R. J., C. J. Redlick (2009), Macroeconomic effects from government purchases and 
taxes, NBER W.P. No. 15369. 
Batini N., G. Callegari and G. Melina (2012), Successful austerity in the United States, 
Europe and Japan, IMF W.P. 190, July  
Beetsma R.M.W.J (2008), A survey of the effects of discretionary fiscal policy, Studier i 
Finanspolitik, 2: 1–37.  
Beetsma R.M.W.J., A.L. Bovenberg. (1998), Monetary union without fiscal coordination 
may discipline policymakers, ‘Journal of International Economics’, 45(2): 239–58 (first 
published as D.P. 1995-59, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research, 1955). 
Beetsma R.M.W.J., A.L. Bovenberg (2001a), The optimality of a monetary union without a 
fiscal union, ‘Journal of Money, Credit and Banking’, 33: 179-204. 
Beetsma R.M.W.J., A.L. Bovenberg (2001b), Structural distortions and decentralized fiscal 
policies in EMU, CEPR Discussion Paper No. 2851. 
Beetsma R.M.W.J., M. Giuliodori (2010), The macroeconomic costs and benefits of the 
EMU and other monetary unions: an overview of recent research, ‘Journal of Economic 
Literature’, 48: 603–641. 
Beetsma R.M.W.J., M. Giuliodori (2011), The effects of government purchases shocks: 
review and estimates for the EU, ‘The Economic Journal’, 121: F4–F32. 
Beetsma R.M.W.J., H. Uhlig (1999), An analysis of the Stability and Growth Pact, 
‘Economic Journal’, 109(458): 546–71 (first published as CEPR D. P. n.  1669, 1997). 
Beetsma R.M.W.J, X. Debrun and F. Klaassen (2001), Is fiscal policy coordination in EMU 
desirable?, ‘Swedish Economic Policy Review’, 8: 57-98. 
Beetsma R.M.W.J., M. Giuliodori and F. Klaassen (2006), Trade spillovers of fiscal policy 
in the European Union: a panel analysis, ‘Economic Policy’, 21(48): 639–87. 
Beetsma R.M.W.J., M. Giuliodori, and F. Klaassen (2008), The effects of public spending 
shocks on trade balances and budget deficits in the EU, ‘Journal of the European 
Economic Association’, 6(2–3): 414–23. 
Benigno P., L. A. Ricci (2011), The inflation-output trade-off with downward wage rigidities, 
‘American Economic Review’, 101(4): 1436-66. 
Bernanke B.S. (2013), The first 100 years of the Federal Reserve: The policy record, 
lessons learned, and prospects for the future, Remarks at a conference sponsored by the 
National Bureau of Economic Research, A century of U.S. central banking: Goals, 
frameworks, accountability, Cambridge, Mass., mimeo, 10 July 
Bernanke B., M. Gertler (1989), Agency costs, net worth and business fluctuations, 
‘American Economic Review’, 79: 14-31. 
Bernanke B., M. Gertler (1990), Financial fragility and economic performance, ‘Quarterly 
Journal of Economics’, 105: 87-114. 
Bernanke B., M. Gertler and S. Gilchrist (1999), The financial accelerator in quantitative 
business cycle framework, in J. Taylor, M. Woodford (eds), Handbook of macroeconomics, 
vol 1C, Amsterdam: North Holland. 
Bibow J. (2012), The euro debt crisis and Germany’s euro trilemma, Levy economics 
institute of Bard College, W. P. N. 771, May. 
 
 
26 
 
Bini Smaghi L., T. Padoa Schioppa and F. Papadia (1994), The transition to Emu in the 
Maastricht Treaty, Princeton Essays in International Finance, 194, November. 
Blanchard O.  J., F. Giavazzi (2002), Current account deficits in the euro area: the end of 
the Feldstein-Horioka puzzle?, ‘Brookings Papers on Economic Activity’, 33:147-18. 
Blanchard O. J., D. Leigh (2013), Growth forecasts and fiscal multipliers, IMF W.P. 13/1, 
January. 
Blanchard O. J., R. Perotti (2002), An empirical characterization of the dynamic effects of 
changes in government spending and taxes on output, ‘Quarterly Journal of Economics’, 
107: 1329–68. 
Blinder A.S. (1998), Central banking in theory and in practice, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT 
Press. 
Blinder A.S. (2004), The case against the case against discretionary fiscal policy, CEPS 
W.P. No. 100. 
Brennan G., J. M. Buchanan (1980), The power to tax: Analytical foundations of a fiscal 
constitution, Liberty Fund, Inc., Indianapolis, 
Broadbent B., K. Daly (2010), Limiting the fall-out from fiscal adjustment, Goldman Sachs 
Global Economics Paper No. 195 (New York: Goldman Sachs). 
Bryson J. H. (1994), Macroeconomic stabilization through monetary and fiscal policy 
coordination: Implications for European Monetary Union, ‘Open Economies Review’, 5: 
307-326. 
Buchanan J. M., G. Tullock (1962), The calculus of consent: Logical foundations of 
constitutional democracy, University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor 
Buchanan, J. M., G. Brennan (1981), Reasons of rules, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge. 
Buiter, W. H. (2002), The fiscal theory of the price level: A critique, ‘Economic Journal’, 
112: 459-480 
Buti M. (2003), ed., Monetary and fiscal policies in EMU. Interactions and coordination, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
Carli, G. (1993), Cinquant’anni di vita italiana, Laterza, Roma-Bari. 
Carli, G. (2003), Lacci e lacciuoli, Luiss University Press, Roma.  
Carpenter S. B., S. Demilrap and J. Eisenschmidt (2013), The effectiveness of the non-
standard policy measures during the financial crises: the experiences of the Federal 
Reserve and the European Central Bank, Federal Reserve Board, W.P. 34, January.  
Casella A. (1989), Letter to the Editor, ‘The Economist’, 22-28 July, p.6. 
Chari V., P.J. Kehoe (2007), On the need for fiscal constraints in a monetary union, 
‘Journal of Monetary Economics’, 54(8): 2399–2408. 
Chari V., P.J. Kehoe (2008), Time inconsistency and free-riding in a monetary union, 
‘Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking’, 40(7): 1329-1355. 
Checherita C., P. Rother (2010), The impact of high and growing government debt on 
economic growth an empirical investigation for the euro area ECB W. P. 1237 
Checherita-Westphal C., A. Hughes Hallett, P. Rother (2014), Fiscal sustainability using 
growth-maximising debt targets, Applied Economics, Vol. 46 (6) 
Coenen G., V. Wieland (2002), Inflation dynamics and international linkages: a model of 
the United States, the euro area and Japan, European Central Bank, W.P. Series 181. 
 
 
27 
 
Coenen G., C. G. Erceg, C. Freedman, D. Furceri, M. Kumhof, L. Lalonde, D. Laxton, J. 
Lind, A. Mourougane, D, Muir, and S. Mursula (2012), Effects of fiscal stimulus in structural 
models, ‘American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics’, 4: 22-68. 
Collignon S. (2001), Economic and policy coordination in EMU: Institutional and political 
requirements, London School of Economics, mimeo. 
Corsetti G., A. Meier and G. Müller (2009), Fiscal stimulus with spending reversals, 
International Monetary Fund W.P. No. 09/106. 
Cozzi T. (2013), La crisi e i moltiplicatori fiscali, ‘Moneta e Credito’, 66: 129-151. 
Cripps M., J. P. Thomas (1994), Reputation and equilibrium selection in a two-person 
repeated games  without discounting, mimeo. 
Cukierman A. (1994), Commitment through delegation, political influence and central bank 
independence, in J. O. De Beaufort Wijnholds, S. C. W. Eijffinger, L. H. Hoogduin (eds.), A 
framework for monetary stability, London: Kluwer.  
Damiani M., F. Pompei and A. Ricci (2011), Temporary job protection and productivity 
growth in EU economies, mimeo. 
De Grauwe P. (2010), The financial crisis and the future of the Euro-zone, Bruges 
European economic briefings, no. 21. 
De Grauwe P. (2011), A less punishing, more forgiving approach to the debt crisis in the 
eurozone, Ceps policy brief, no. 230. 
De Haan J., J. Sturm (1992), The case for central bank independence, ‘BNL Quarterly 
Review’, 45, September. 
DeLong B., L. H. Summers (2012), Fiscal policy in a depressed economy, mimeo, March 
20 
Diamond P. A., (1965), National debt in a neoclassical growth model, ‘American Economic 
Review’, 55(5): 1126-1150. 
Dixit, A. K. (1996), The making of economic policy: A transaction-cost politics approach, 
MIT Press, Cambridge. 
Dixit, A. K., L. Lambertini (2001), Monetary-fiscal policy interactions and commitment 
versus discretion in a monetary union, ‘European Economic Review’, 45: 977-987. 
Downs A. (1957), An Economic Theory of Democracy, Harper & Brothers, New York 
Eichengreen, B. (1993), European monetary unification, ‘Journal of Economic Literature’, 
31(3): 1321–57.  
Eichengreen B., J.A. Frieden (2000), The political economy of European monetary 
unification, Boulder: Westview Press. 
Eichengreen B., C. Wyplosz (1993), The unstable EMS, ‘Brookings Papers on Economic 
Activity’, 1: 51-124. 
Erceg, C., C. Gust and D. Lopez Salido (2007), The transmission of domestic shocks in the 
open economy, ch. 2 in NBER, International dimensions of monetary policy, 89146, New 
York. 
European Commission (1990), One market, one money, ‘European Economy’, 44, 
October. 
European Commission (1991), The economics of EMU. Background studies prepared for 
European Economy n.44 ’One market, one money ‘, n.1, Special edition  
Eurostat (2011), General government debt, 20 May. 
 
 
28 
 
Feldstein, M. (1997), The political economy of the European economic and monetary 
union: Political sources of an economic liability,  ‘Journal of Economic Perspectives’, 11(4): 
23–42. 
Fisher I. (1933), The debt-deflation theory of the Great Depression, ‘Econometrica’, 1: 337-
357. 
Frankel J., A. Razin (1987), Spending, taxes and real exchange rates, IMF W.P. No. 87/62. 
Friedman M. (1960), A program for monetary stability, Fordham University Press, New 
York. 
Friedman M. (1962), Should there be an independent monetary authority?, in L. B. Yeager 
(ed.), In search of a monetary constitution, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass. 
Friedman, M. (1968), The role of monetary policy, ‘American Economic Review’, 58: 1-17. 
Friedman M. (1969),The optimum quantity of money, in The optimum quantity of money 
and other essays, Chicago, Aldine. 
Fudenberg D., D. K. Levine (1992), Maintaining a reputation when strategies are 
imperfectly observed, ‘Review of Economic Studies’, 59,561–579. 
Galbraith J. K. (1987), Economics in perspective. A critical history, Boston: Houghton 
Mifflin Company. 
Giavazzi G., Pagano M. (1988), The advantage of tying one’s hands: EMS discipline and 
central bank credibility, ‘European Economic Review’, 32: 1055–1082. 
Giavazzi F., M. Pagano (1990), Can severe fiscal contractions be expansionary? Tales of 
two small European countries, ‘NBER Macroeconomics Annual’, Vol. 5 (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: National Bureau of Economic Research). 
Gordon R. J. (1976), Recent developments in the theory of inflation and unemployment, 
‘Journal of Monetary Economics’, 2: 185-219.  
Graham L., D.J. Snower (2008), Hyperbolic discounting and the Phillips Curve, ‘Journal of 
Money, Credit and Banking’, 40: 427-448. 
Greenwald B., J. Stiglitz (1988), Imperfect information, finance constraints and business 
fluctuations, in M. Kohn, S. Tsiang (eds.), Finance constraints, expectations and 
macroeconomics, Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
Greenwald B., J. Stiglitz (1990), Macroeconomic models with equity and credit rationing, in 
R.G. Hubbard (ed.), Asymmetric information, corporate finance and investment, Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press. 
Greenwald B., J. Stiglitz (1993), Financial market imperfections and business cycles, 
‘Quarterly Journal of Economics’, 108: 77-114. 
Gros D., N. Thygesen (1992), European monetary integration, London: Longman. 
Hayo B. (1998), Inflation culture, central bank independence and price stability, ‘European 
Journal of Political Economy’, 14: 241-63. 
Hebous S. (2010), The effects of discretionary fiscal policy on macroeconomic aggregates: 
a reappraisal, Goethe University Frankfurt, July 2009, Munich personal Repec archive 
Paper No. 23300, online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/23300/. 
Hetzel R. L. (2013), ECB monetary policy in the recession: A New Keynesian (Old 
Monetarist) critique, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, W. P. No 13-07 
Hughes Hallett A. (2000), Aggregate Phillips curves are not always vertical: heterogeneity 
and mismatch in multiregion or multisector economies, ‘Macroeconomic Dynamics’, 4: 534-
46. 
 
 
29 
 
Hibbs D. J. (1977) Political parties and macroeconomic policy, American Political Science 
Review, 71: 1467-1487. 
Inman R. P. (1996), Do balanced budget rules work? U.S. experience and possible 
lessons for the EMU, NBER W. P. No. 5838, February. 
 International Monetary Fund (2010), Recovery, risk, and rebalancing, world economic and 
financial surveys, ‘World Economic Outlook’, October 
International Monetary Fund (2012), Liberalizing capital flows and managing outflows, 
March 13 
International Monetary Fund (2013), Unconventional monetary policies. Recent experience 
and prospects, IMF Policy Paper Series, April 
Iwata, K. (2012), The blurring line between monetary and fiscal policy in advanced 
economies, mimeo. November 
King (1995), Comment on J. B. Taylor’s, The monetary policy implications of greater fiscal 
discipline, in Budget, debt, and deficits: Issues and solutions, Federal Reserve Bank of 
Kansas City, 1995, pp. 151-170  
Kiyotaki N., J. Moore (1997), Credit cycles, ‘Journal of Political Economy’, 105: 211-248. 
Kiyotaki N., J. Moore (2002), Balance-sheet contagion, ‘American Economic Review’, 
92(2): 46-50. 
Kohn D. L. (2010), The Federal Reserve’s policy actions during the financial crisis and 
lessons for the future, Carleton University, Ottawa, 13 May.  
Kollmann R. (2009), Government purchases and the real exchange rate, CEPR D. P, No. 
7427.  
Kumar M.S., J. Woo (2010), Public debt and growth, IMF W.P. No. 10/174. 
Kuttner K.N., A.S. Posen (2001), The Great Recession: Lessons for macroeconomic policy 
from Japan, ‘Brookings Papers on Economic Activity’, 2: 93–185. 
Kydland, F..E., E. C. Prescott (1977), Rules rather than discretion: the inconsistency of 
optimal plans, ‘Journal of Political Economy’, 85: 473-492. 
Leeper E. M. (1991), Equilibria under ‘active’ and ‘passive’ monetary and fiscal policies, 
‘Journal of Monetary Economics’, 27(1): 129:147 
Lucas, R. E. (1976), Econometric policy evaluation. A critique, Journal of Monetary 
Economics, Supplement, Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, 1: 19-
46. 
Lucas R. E. (1996), Nobel lecture: Monetary neutrality, ‘Journal of Political Economy’, 104: 
661-682. 
Majone G. (1994), The European Community. An "Independent Fourth Branch of 
Government?", in  G. Brüggemeier, (ed.), Verfassungen für ein ziviles Europa, 
Nomos, Baden-Baden 
Majone G. (1996), Regulating Europe, Routledge, London. 
Michalak T., J. Engwerda and J. Plasmans (2009), Strategic interactions between fiscal 
and monetary authorities in a multi-country New-Keynesian model of a monetary union, 
CESifo W.P. No. 2534.  
Minsky H. (1982), Can "It" happen again?: Essays on instability and finance, New York: 
Sharpe M.E. 
 
 
30 
 
Mishkin, F. S., Schmidt-Hebbel, K. (2007),  Does Inflation Targeting Make a Difference?, 
NBER W.P. 
1287. 
Modigliani F. (1961), Long-run implications of alternative fiscal policies and the burden of 
the national debt, ‘The Economic Journal’, 71: 730-755. 
Mundell R.A. (1961), The theory of optimum currency areas, ‘American Economic Review’, 
51: 657-664. 
Nordhaus W. D. (1975), The political business cycle, ‘Review of Economic Studies’, 42(2): 
169-190. 
Nuti D. M. (2013), Austerity versus development, mimeo 
Obstfeld M., K. Rogoff (1995), Exchange rate dynamics redux, ‘Journal of Political 
Economy’, 103(3): 624-660. 
Olson M. (1965), The logic of collective action: Public goods and the theory of groups, 
Harvard University Press, Cambridge. 
Onorante L. (2006), Interaction of fiscal policies on the Euro area: how much pressure on 
the ECB?, European University Institute W.P. No. 2006/9. 
Ozkan F. G., A. C. Sibert, A. Sutherland (2004), Monetary union and the Maastricht 
inflation criterion: the accession countries, ‘Economics of Transition’, 12(4): 635-52 
Papadimitriou D. B., M. Nikiforos and G. Zezza (2013), The Greek economic crisis and the 
experience of austerity. A strategic analysis, Levy Economics Institute of Bard College, 
July. 
Phelps E. S. (1967), Phillips curve, expectations of inflation and optimal unemployment 
over time, ‘Economica’, 34: 254-281 
Posen A. (1994), Is central bank independence the result of effective opposition to 
inflation? Evidence of endogenous monetary policy institutions, Harvard University, 
Cambridge Mass, mimeo. 
Ravn M., S. Schmitt-Grohé and M. Uribe (2007), Explaining the effects of government 
spending shocks on consumption and the real exchange rate, mimeo, EUI Florence and 
Duke University. 
Reinhart C., K. Rogoff (2010), Growth in a time of debt, NBER W.P. 15639, ‘American 
Economic Review’, 100(2): 573-78. 
Rogoff K. (1985), The optimal degree of commitment to an intermediate monetary target, 
‘Quarterly Journal of Economics’, 100: 1169-1189. 
Saint-Paul, G. (1992), Fiscal policy in an endogenous growth model, ‘The Quarterly 
Journal of Economics’, 107(4): 1243-59. 
Sargent T., N. Wallace (1975), “Rational" expectations, the optimal monetary instrument, 
and the optimal money supply rule, ‘Journal of Political Economy’, 83(2): 241-54.  
Sargent T., N. Wallace (1981) Some unpleasant monetarist arithmetic, ‘Federal Reserve 
Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review’, 531:1-17 
Schelkle W. (2013), Monetary integration in crisis: how well do existing theories explain the 
predicament of EMU?,  ‘Transfer: European Review of Labour and Research’, 19(1): 37-48 
Schmidt K. M. (1993), Reputation and equilibrium characterization in repeated games of 
conflicting Interests, ‘Econometrica’, 61(2): 325–351. 
 
 
31 
 
Schmitt-Grohé S., M. Uribe (2004) Optimal fiscal and monetary policy under sticky prices, 
‘Journal of Economic Theory’, 114: 198-230.  
Semmler W., A. Semmler (2013), The macroeconomics of the fiscal consolidation in the 
European Union, mimeo, June 15. 
Sibert A. (1999), Monetary integration and economic reform, ‘The Economic Journal’, 109: 
78-92 
Sims C. A. (1994), A simple model for study of the determination of the price level and the 
interaction between monetary and fiscal policy, ‘Economic theory’, 4(3): 381-399 
Spilimbergo, A., S. Symansky, and M. Schindler (2009), Fiscal multipliers, IMF Staff 
Position Note SPN/09/11, Washington: International Monetary Fund. 
Spolaore E. (2013), What Is European integration really about? A political guide for 
economists, ‘Journal of Economic Perspectives’, 27(3): 125-44 
Stiglitz, J. E (2013a), A revolution in monetary policy: lessons in the wake of the global 
financial crisis. C D Deshmukh Lecture, 3 January, Reserve Bank of India, Mumbai 
Stiglitz J. (2013b), An agenda to save the euro, Social Europe Journal, 5 December, 
http://www.social-europe.eu/2013/12/agenda-to-save-the-euro/ 
Svensson L. E. O. (1997), Optimal inflation targets, `conservative' central banks, and linear 
inflation contracts, NBER W. P. No. 5251, 1995, in ‘American Economic Review’, 87: 98-
114  
Tabellini G., Alesina A. (1988), Credibility and politics, ‘European Economic Review’, 32: 
542-550. 
Taylor J. B. (2013), The effectiveness of central bank independence versus policy rules, 
Stanford University, SIEPR D.P. 12-009, January   
Tirelli P., G. Di Bartolomeo and N. Acocella (2010), The optimal inflation rate revisited, 
W.P. No. 76, Memotef, Sapienza Università di Roma. 
Turner Ph. (2013), Benign neglect of the long term interest rate, BIS W.P. No 403, 
February 
Williams J. C. (2011), Unconventional monetary policy: Lessons from the past three years, 
‘Economic Letter’, 2011-31, Federal Reserve of San Francisco, October. 
Wittman D. (1977), Candidates with policy preferences: A dynamic model, ‘Journal of 
Economic Theory’, 14(1): 180- 189. 
Woodford M. (1996), Control of the public debt: A requirement for price stability, NBER 
W.P. 5684, July 
Woodford M. (2007), The case for forecast targeting as a monetary policy strategy, 
‘Journal of Economic Perspectives’, 21: 3-24.  
Woodford M. (2008), Forward guidance for monetary policy: Is it still possible?, ‘Vox’, 17 
January. 
Wyplosz C. (2006), European Monetary Union: The dark sides of a major success, 
‘Economic Policy’, 46: 207–47. 
